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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Listed companies are required to disclose their financial statements to its 
users as a basis in decision making. Since there are a number of parties concerned 
with the financial statements, then the informations provided in the financial 
statements must have a good quality so that it could be used by those parties. The 
quality of a financial statement can be judged from its characteristics. According 
to FASB in Statement of Financial Accounting No.2, the two most important 
characteristics are relevance and reliability. However, both of these characteristics 
are very difficult to measure, so that the users of information require the services 
of a third party. This is where an independent auditor takes part. They can provide 
assurance that the financial statements are in accordance with GAAP. That service 
helps to increase the confidence of both internal and external users.  
Independent auditor must ensure quality of their works. Audit quality is 
important because high quality audits will produce reliable financial reports as a 
basis for decision making. A good quality of audit is when auditor is able to 
discover material mistatement in client’s financial statements and willing to report 
the mistatement to users (DeAngelo,1981). Auditor’s ability to discover 
mistatement is based on their competence, while their willingness to report the 
mistatements is based on their independence.From the auditor experience 
perspective, audit quality increases with audit firm tenure as the auditor gains a 
better understanding of the client’s system, business and industry environment, 
 and internal controls (AICPA, 1978). From the auditor independence viewpoint, 
on the other hand, audit quality decreases with audit firm tenure as the auditor 
bonds himself to the client due to either economic bond or social bond (Brooks et 
al., 2012). 
Size of audit firms can be used as an indicator of independence because 
the main concern of big audit firms are not the same as the smaller one in terms of 
the possibility of losing a client. Therefore bigger audit firm can result in higher 
audit quality since the firm is not afraid to be objective (DeAngelo, 1981).Yu 
(2007) found that there is a significant relationship between the size of audit firm 
with audit quality. He found that bigger audit firms that are systematic will 
definitely result in a higher quality audits. He based his research on two 
arguments made by previous studies. First, auditors working in a bigger company 
has more experience of meeting with different types of clients, and make them 
have a collective experience so that they are able to provide higher quality audits. 
Second, economic dependence can compromise the objectivity and independence 
of auditors. Itcreates incentives for small local practice offices to be lenient and 
report favorably in order to retain clients. 
Other than audit firm’s size, audit tenure can also be an indicator of 
auditor’s independence. According to Flint (1988), independence might be lost if 
the auditor is involved in a personal relationship with the client, since this may 
influence their mental attitude and opinion. One of the cause of low independence 
is lengthy tenure. He argued that lengthy tenure in office may cause the auditors 
to develop over-cosy relationships as well as strong loyalty or emotional 
relationships with their clients, which could be a threat to auditor independence. 
 Lengthy tenure also results in over familiarity and consequently, the quality and 
competence of auditors’ work may decline when they start to make unjustified 
assumptions instead of objective evaluation of current evidence. 
Regulation regarding audit rotation may be established based on an 
assumption that longer relationship between auditor and its client will reduce 
auditor’s independence (Siregar et al.,2011).Regulation regarding audit rotation is 
published by government in Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 
423/KMK.06/2002, which was amended to Decree of Ministry of Finance No. 
359/KMK.06/2003 that obliged companies to limit the auditor assignment period 
within 5 years and the public accountant within 3 years. That decrees were then 
revised with Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 17/PMK.01/2008 on public 
accountant service which limited the auditor assignment period within 6 years and 
public accountant within 3 years. 
There is no concrete evidence of the effectiveness of the ideas of this 
rotation. However, there are already a substantial amount of previous studiesthat 
tests on the effects of auditor rotation to audit quality, whether audit quality 
increases or decreases with auditor rotation. The results of those studies have been 
conflicting. Some studies indicate that rotation enhances auditquality (Carey and 
Simnett, 2006), while others indicate thatthere are no significant beneficial effects 
of audit rotation on audit quality (e.g.,Cameran et al., 2008 and Jackson et al., 
2007).  
In Indonesian context there are also several studies regarding audit 
rotation. Siregar et al. (2011) concludes thatthere should be rules to overcome the 
negative effects of too long period of audit, but not the audit firm rotation rules 
 that exist today because it seems not too effective.There is also research by Nadia 
(2015) that concludes that audit rotation results in lower audit quality. And 
research by Siregar et al. (2012) that shows that auditor rotation before regulation 
(voluntary rotation) did increase audit quality, whereas mandatory auditor rotation 
does not show having positive effects on audit quality. 
According to Febrianto (2009), the absence of regulation regarding audit 
rotation will provide an opportunity for the auditor to maintain the relationship 
with its client for as long as possible, although such action might reduce their 
independence. So the existence of the regulation that restrict auditor tenure will 
limit the dependence of auditor on the client and possibility for violations of the 
independence will be reduced.But on the other hand, Irianto et al. (2014) reveals 
that the tight rules has caused many reactions and debate. The debate as to 
whether or not the existence ofregulation of audit firm rotation is required, has 
result in investigations aimed to provide empirical evidence for each argument 
regarding the concept of audit firm and audit partnerrotation. One of the reaction 
arising from the regulation of audit rotation is the emergence of tricky attitude 
which is called as pseudo audit rotation. Pseudo audit rotation is the condition 
where legally there has been a change of the auditor, but substantially the 
relationship between the auditor and the client is still in progress.An illustration of 
pseudo audit rotation is when, for example, company A is audited by Prasetio, 
Sarwoko & Sandjaja from 2009 until 2014, which means that according to PMK 
no. 17 2008, company A must switch to other audit firm in 2015. But in order to 
be able to keep company A as its client, Prasetio, Sarwoko & Sandjaja change its 
name into Purwantono, Sarwoko & Sandjaja and continue auditing company A in 
 2015 because legally, audit rotation has occured. but both of those audit firms are 
substantially the same which is indicated by same foreign audit firm affiliation, 
Ernst & Young (EY).In other words, pseudo audit rotation is an attempt to extend 
audit tenure with old clients without violating government rules. If pseudo 
rotation continues, the effect will be the same as long audit tenure since both 
might affect auditor's independence.  
In this research, the quality of audit focused on the aspects of 
independence. Therefore, my research will study audit quality from independence 
point of view based on the relationship between types of audit rotation and audit 
firm’s size with audit quality.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
Audit quality does not seem to escape the general audit standard contained 
in the Statements on Auditing Standards, namely adequate technical skills and 
training, independence in mental attitude, and professional proficiency with care 
and thoroughness.Independence means a mental attitude free from influence, not 
controlled by others, not dependent on others, there is honesty in the auditor's self 
in considering facts and there is objective considerations in auditor's self in 
formulating and expressing his opinion (Mulyadi, 2002). 
The issuance of regulations governing the rotation of audit partner and 
audit firm is intended to maintain the independence of auditors. The financial 
statements are the basis of decision-making for investors, that is why in the 
preparation of financial statements, auditor should be independent. Independence 
 will be lost if the auditor is involved in a personal relationship with the client 
because it can affect the opinion and attitude of the auditor's mental (Flint 1988). 
Thus, regulation regarding audit rotation is expected to limit the relationship 
between auditor and client so that independence is maintained. 
 Independence is also attributed to the size of the firm's audit. Big four 
audit firms tend to be seen as having higher independence due to the absence of 
economic dependence on clients. In addition, Yu (2007) argued that large audit 
firms will inevitably result in better quality audits because auditors incorporated 
in large audit firms have more experience with diverse clients, so they are able to 
produce higher quality audits. 
1. What is the relationship betweendifferent type of audit rotation with 
audit quality? 
2. What is therelationship betweenaudit firm’s sizewith audit quality? 
1.3 Research Objectives 
1. This research is aimed to find empirical evidence about the practice of 
pseudo audit rotation in companies in Indonesia, so regulators can 
consider new regulation that can actually increase audit quality. 
2. This researchstudies the relationship between mandatory audit rotation, 
pseudo-mandatory audit rotation and voluntary audit rotation on audit 
quality. 
3. According to DeAngelo (1981), the quality of audit conducted by public 
accountants can be seen from the size of the audit firm. Therefore this 
 research is aimed to test the relationship between of audit firm’s size on 
audit quality. 
 
1.4 Research Benefits 
The results of this research are expected to provide contributions as follows: 
1. Since there are still not many research regarding pseudo audit rotation, this 
research will provide additional reference in the field of audit quality. 
2. The results of this research are expected to be useful for stakeholders in 
order to be more critical in using financial informations. 
3. The result of this research is expected to be a reference for regulators in 
determining effective regulations to increase auditors’ independence. 
 
1.5 Writing Systematic 
The writing systematic of this research is as follows: 
Chapter I is the introduction. This chapter contains the background of the 
problem, the problem statement, the objectives and benefits of the research, and 
writing systematic.Chapter II discusses literature review. This chapter examines 
the theoretical basis and previous research, describe the framework, and formulate 
the research hypothesis.Chapter III is the research method section. This chapter 
will discuss the research variables and operational definition of variables, 
population, and sample, types and sources of data, methods of data collection, and 
data analysis methods.Chapter IV is the result and analysis of research section. 
This chapter contains the description of the object of research, data analysis, and 
the results of hypotheses testing, as well as the interpretation of the results of 
 hypotheses testing.Chapter V is the closure. This chapter will present the 
conclusions and limitations of the research that has been done as well as advice, 
for further research and for the parties concerned. 
